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INTRODUCTION

On Monday, January 28, 2013, a group of eight United States
(“U.S.”) senators introduced a “Bipartisan Framework for
1
Comprehensive Immigration Reform” (“Bipartisan Framework”). In
asserting that the United States immigration system is “broken,” the
senators offered a plan aimed at, inter alia, “creating a tough but fair
legalization program for individuals who are currently here [that will]
ensure that this is a successful permanent reform to our immigration
2
system that will not need to be revisited.” This model for
immigration reform, proposed by Senators Schumer, McCain,
Durbin, Graham, Menendez, Rubio, Bennet, and Flake included four
3
“basic legislative pillars.” The focus of this Article is one of these four
legislative pillars of immigration reform: that aimed at creating “a
tough but fair path to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants
4
currently living in the United States . . . .” This Article uses the
analytical frameworks found in literature on policy innovation and
nondecision making to explore whether the comprehensive
immigration reform set forth in the Bipartisan Framework amounts
5
to policy innovation or nondecision.
According to the literature on policy innovation, policies
adopted as “new” by an individual or aggregation of individuals are
6
viewed as innovations. The key is not whether the idea is new as
measured by the interval in time since its first use or its invention;
rather, it is whether the person or persons adopting the idea perceive
*Adjunct Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law and Associate
Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri-St. Louis.
1
Senators Schumer, McCain, Durbin, Graham, Menendez, Rubio, Bennet, and
Flake, Bipartisan Framework for Comprehensive Immigration Reform (Jan. 28, 2013),
available at , http://www.flake.senate.gov/documents/immigration_reform.pdf
[hereinafter Bipartisan Framework]. See also Julia Preston, Senators Offer a Bipartisan
Blueprint
for
Immigration,
N.Y.TIMES
(Jan.
28,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/28/us/politics/senators-agree-on-blueprint-forimmigration.html?_r=0.
2
Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 1.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
See generally Lawrence. B. Mohr, Determinants of Innovation in Organizations,
63AM. POL. SCI. REV. 111 (1969) (discussing policy innovation); Peter Bachrach &
Morton S. Baratz, Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework, 57AM. POL.
SCI.REV. 632 (1963) (discussing nondecisions).
6
See generally EVERETT M. ROGERS, DIFFUSIONS OF INNOVATION 12 (5th ed. 2003).
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it or deem it as new. In the particular context of immigration law,
policy innovation refers to the adoption of problem-solving
approaches that depart from traditional legislative approaches
7
regarding regulation of immigration.
The argument in this Article is that the Bipartisan Framework’s
plan to create a pathway to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants
will not amount to policy innovation, but will instead reflect
nondecisions by Congress resulting from the contentious nature of
immigration reform and the resulting electoral stakes involved.
Nondecisions are the absence of substantive decision making outputs
that, in the context of legislation, result from a concerted effort by
policy gatekeepers to keep “really pressing problems inherent in postindustrial American democracy off the political agenda by controlling
8
what [is], and what [is] not, ‘legitimate’ to raise in government fora.”
The nature of nondecisions in the legislative arena has been
adequately characterized by Francis Lee, a professor of government
and politics at the University of Maryland, who stated the following:
Nondecisions occur in congressional agenda setting when
rank and file members willingly acquiesce in party leaders’
authority or in legislative strategies developed in
consultation with fellow partisans. Nondecisions also occur
when members adjust their own actions in anticipation of
what their party leaders and fellow partisans will support.
These nondecisions take place for a variety of reasons,
including members’ electoral stakes in their parties’
collective policy performance, their individual desires to
move up through their party’s ranks by “going along to get
along,” their susceptibility to peer-group pressures exerted
by fellow partisans, and their inclination to support the
party line as a default position in the absence of contrary
9
inclinations.
This Article argues that genuine reform of the United States
immigration system will require a distinct departure from current
and past U.S. immigration policies in order for such policies to be

7

Id.
A. E. Keir Nash, In Re Radical Interpretations of American Law: The Relation of Law
and History, 82 MICH. L. REV. 274, 324-25 (1983).
9
Francis Lee, Agreeing to Disagree: Agenda Content and Senate Partisanship, 1981–
2004, 33 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 199, 201-02 (2008) (internal quotations omitted).
8
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innovative. Reform will require an approach that abandons old
policies and introduces a new and improved course of action.
Analyzed through this lens, it is clear that this portion of the
Bipartisan Framework suggests that Congress will restate and revisit
past Congressional policies, some of which remain in effect as
codified in various sections of the federal law. Overall, this signals
that Congress will promulgate policies cloaked in reform-oriented
propaganda, but that are in reality nondecisions reflecting the strong
degree of electoral uncertainty resulting from the polarizing nature
of immigration policy. Such nondecisions are a means to avoid the
potential pitfalls and risks of adopting true policy innovation while
still maintaining the outward appearance of lawmaking.
The next section of this Article discusses the literature on policy
innovation and nondecisions in the context of immigration
policymaking. From there, the six major elements of the first pillar of
the Bipartisan Framework, which relate to a pathway to citizenship
for unauthorized immigrants already presented in the United States,
are analyzed. After listing the six elements of the first pillar of the
Bipartisan Framework, each element is analyzed by discussing how
federal law already approaches or has historically approached
addressing the stated legislative goal. This Article argues that the
proposed plan suggests Congress will not innovate by adopting new
immigration policies that are a departure from current immigration
policies. Rather, the Bipartisan Framework suggests that Congress will
restate and revisit immigration policies that are presently codified in
various sections of federal law. This Article argues that the failure to
adopt substantively new approaches towards regulating unauthorized
immigration is a reflection of nondecision making by Congress.
II.

THE UTILITY OF THE LITERATURE ON POLICY INNOVATION
AND NONDECISIONS FOR ANALYZING PROPOSED
IMMIGRATION REFORM

Lawrence Mohr, Professor Emeritus of political science and
public policy at University of Michigan, in a seminal work on policy
innovation, states that innovation can be measured by the extent to
which actors “adopt and emphasize programs that depart from
10
traditional concerns.” According to Mohr, the concept of innovation
10

Mohr, supra note 5, at 111.
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is defined as “the successful introduction into an applied situation of
11
means or ends that are new to that situation.” Mohr argues that
innovation tends to be a function of three major factors: (1) the
motivation to innovate, (2) the strength of obstacles against
innovation, and (3) the availability of resources for overcoming such
12
obstacles. Frances Stokes Berry and William D. Berry, two of the
leading scholars in the field of policy innovation, likewise point out
13
several factors that influence policy innovation. According to Berry
and Berry, social, political, and economic factors, as well as internal
organizational factors, can affect whether decionmakers ultimately
14
decide to innovate or maintain the status quo.
The framework set forth by Mohr, Berry, and Berry can be used
to explain the lack of federal immigration policy innovation. The
following section sets forth a number of examples to support this
argument and to illustrate how the presence of these factors will
impede congressional immigration initiatives and result in
nondecisions.
Nondecision making in the lawmaking process is the antithesis
to policy innovation. The literature on nondecision making is an
outgrowth of the seminal work of Peter Bachrach and Morton S.
Baratz, which focuses on the nature of community power and the
15
characteristics of decision making versus nondeicison making. While
many scholars have employed Bachrach and Baratz’s analysis to
investigate agenda control and decision making in various contexts,
this line of literature is sorely understudied and underemployed as a
research paradigm in the legal academic field— particularly in law
16
review articles. This Article seeks to utilize the discourse on
nondecisions and policy innovation in the context of lawmaking, and
11

Id. at 112 (emphasis added).
Id. at 114.
13
See generally Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as
Policy Innovations: An Event History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 395 (1990).
14
Id. at 396.
15
Bachrach & Baratz, surpa note 5 at 632-42.
16
To be sure, however, there are a handful of law review articles employing
Bachrach and Baratz’s nondecision paradigm. See, e.g., Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault's
Approach to Power: Its Allure and Limits for Collaborative Lawyering, 2004 UTAH L. REV.
395, 402 (2004); Murray Edelman, The Construction of Social Problems as Buttresses of
Inequalities, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 7, 28 (1987); Yoav Dotan, Campaign Finance and the
Social Inequality Paradox, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 955,1016 (2003-2004).
12
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to demonstrate its utility for understanding how critical decisions in
the lawmaking realm are influenced by this paradigm.
One piece of scholarship that does employ the literature on
policy innovation to examine the role of law and courts in promoting
innovation is Mark Kessler’s article on legal mobilization for social
17
reform. Kessler finds that, by manipulating judicial agendas,
specialized interests are able to effectively constrain the voices of
policy innovation advocates, such as poverty lawyers seeking to
18
mobilize issues of social reform. Kessler also notes that legal
advocates who pressed for innovative changes in policies aimed at
helping the poor were labeled with social stigmas (e.g., “unpatriotic,”
19
“radical,” “rabble rousers,” “trouble makers,” etc.). Such stigmas
undermined these attorneys’ willingness to effectuate change and
20
ultimately resulted in nondecisions. Kessler points out that
advocates for change “had no alternative sources of support enabling
them to resist efforts by powerful local interests to prevent reform
21
issues from reaching court agendas.” Much like policies aimed at
helping the poor, rhetoric surrounding immigration reform is so
polarizing that lawmakers find it more prudent to maintain the status
quo rather than to innovate, in order to avoid the possible electoral
implications attached to supporting immigration reform. Indeed, the
discourse on reform is laden with propaganda that aims to stigmatize
those who advocate for reform.
The polarizing nature of immigration reform was illustrated in a
2007 New York Times article that featured comments by several newly
22
elected senators regarding immigration reform. For example,
Senator Jon Tester, Democrat from Montana, stated that opposition
to a 2007 immigration reform bill came from his constituents of all
political leanings: “I do hear from my constituents, and I have to tell
17
Mark Kessler, Legal Mobilization for Social Reform: Power and the Politics of Agenda
Setting, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 121, 143 (1990).
18
Id. at 114. Mohr makes a similar argument is his discussion of obstacles against
innovation. See Mohr, supra note 5 at 114.
19
Id. at 135.
20
Id. See also, Mohr, supra note 5 at 114 (discussing motivation, or lack thereof, to
innovate).
21
Kessler, supra note 17, at 138. Mohr makes a similar argument that a lack of
resources often poses an obstacle to innovation. See Mohr, supra note 5 at 114.
22
Carl Hulse, New Senators Resist Overhaul of Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (June 28,
2007). http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/28/washington/28dems.html.
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you it is overwhelmingly do not touch [immigration reform].”
Joining in Senator Tester’s reluctance to support the 2007
immigration bill was Senator Claire McCaskill, Democrat from
Missouri, who described her constituents’ response to the 2007 bill as
24
“‘adamantly opposed’ to the legislation.” As evidenced by these
legislators’ statements, robust constituency disfavor towards
immigration innovation was an obstacle that weakened motivation to
adopt immigration policy reform.
Fast-forwarding to the immigration reform debate on Capitol
Hill in 2013, not much, if anything, has changed. Despite the fact that
the Senate passed the Bipartisan Framework as the Border Security,
Economic Opportunity and Immigration Modernization Act in June
25
of 2013, later that same year the legislation remained mired in the
web of Capitol Hill partisan politics— in particular, in the U.S. House
26
of Representatives.
In addition, President Barack Obama opined that blame for this
lack of action on immigration reform is on internal Republican
27
caucus politics. It is noteworthy, however, that the arguments of
lawmakers opposed to the 2013 immigration reform sound strikingly
similar to those made during the 2007 debates. For example,
Representative Steve King of Iowa characterized the battle over
28
immigration reform as an issue of respect for U.S. law. In an
interview on Meet the Press, King said, “I’ve spent time at the state fair,
at the Family Leadership Summit yesterday; I’ve been all over my
district in Iowa, which is 39 of the 99 counties. It is a universal
message that says, ‘Hold your ground. Keep telling the truth. Defend

23

Id.
Alexander Bolton, Conservatives: Public backlash to immigration reform is coming,
THE HILL (June 1, 2013), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/302893conservatives-say-big-public-backlash-to-immigration-reform-is-coming-.
25
S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013).
26
Ashley Parker, Republicans in House Resist Overhaul for Immigration, N.Y. TIMES
(July 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/us/politics/gop-in-houseresists-overhaul-for-immigration.html.
27
Ben Shapiro, Obama Blames Internal Republican Politics for Immigration Reform
Slowdown,
BREITBART
(Aug.
9,
2013),
http://www.breitbart.com/BigGovernment/2013/08/09/Obama-Blames-Internal-Republican-Caucus-Politics-forImmigration-Reform-Slowdown.
28
Id.
24
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29

the rule of law and defend the Constitution.’” Many Republican
members in the House of Representatives “represent conservative
congressional districts and are not convinced that immigration
30
reform represents good policy or good politics.” As a result of the
fear that a critical mass of Congressional Republicans, as well as
centrist Democrats, have of alienating their conservative voting base,
many legislators have little or no motivation to promulgate innovative
31
immigration reform. Steven Camarota, Director of research for the
Center for Immigration Studies, summarized this position by stating,
“the Republicans don’t have that much incentive to deal with
32
[immigration reform].”
Berry and Berry’s thesis that social, political, and economic
factors affect innovation is similarly applicable in the context of
33
immigration reform. An investigation by Heather Creek and
Stephen Yoder on local level efforts to address immigration
enforcement illustrates how the factors identified by Berry and Berry
34
come into play in the immigration policy arena. Although the
policies studied by Creek and Yoder are local in scope, they are
similar in nature to the federal immigration policy reform studied in
this Article because they deal with the contentious issue of
immigration policies aimed at regulating the presence of persons
35
unlawfully present in the United States.
Creek and Yoder find there are a number of key social, political
and economic factors that underlie whether a local government
chooses to adopt Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”) with the

29

Steve King, NBC “Meet the Press” - Transcript: Immigration, VOTESMART (Aug. 11,
2013),
http://votesmart.org/public-statement/802929/nbc-meet-the-presstranscript-immigration#.UmcLR_Mo7cs.
30
Dan Nowicki, Time Running Out for Immigration Reform, USA TODAY (Oct.20,
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/10/20/hopes-dim-forimmigrationreform/3062199/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Fe
ed%3A+usatoday-NewsTopStories+(USATODAY+-+News+Top+Stories).
31
See Mohr, supra note 5 at 114.
32
Nowicki, supra note 30.
33
See Berry & Berry, supra note 14.
34
See Heather M. Creek & Stephen Yoder, With a Little Help from Our Feds:
Understanding State Immigration Enforcement Policy Adoption in American Federalism, 40
POL’Y STUD. J. 674 (2012).
35
See generally id.
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United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) agency
under § 287(g) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act, which authorizes states to enforce criminal
36
immigration laws. First, Creek and Yoder find that the political
37
leadership of a state has a correlation to the adoption of MOAs. In
particular, states with Republican governors are more likely to adopt
an MOA allowing local law enforcement to assist ICE in detaining
38
violators of national immigration law. As far as social variables,
Creek and Yoder find that an increase in a state’s Hispanic
population from one year to the next is related to a decrease in the
39
likelihood of MOA adoption in the following year. With regard to
economic factors, Creek and Yoder find that states exerting more
budgetary effort on public welfare are more likely to adopt an MOA;
in other words, if there is a perception that “immigrants are driving
up the expenditures on public welfare, then state elites will enact
40
legislation intended to reduce that draw on the state budget.”
Apart from those identified by Creek and Yoder, other economic
and social factors have been believed to bear on the immigration
reform discourse. One such additional economic factor that has been
identified to affect immigration reform is the weak state of the U.S.
41
economy. With the U.S. economy in a state of recession and
unemployment rates rising, American workers may fear that
unauthorized immigrants will compete with them for jobs, driving
down wages for labor and depleting new positions created by the
42
taxpayer-funded stimulus plan. Another social factor affecting
decisions regarding immigration policy is a significant visible increase
in the Latino population in locales that have not historically had
43
significant populations of such persons. The tension that can result
36

8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
Creek & Yoder, supra note 34, at 680.
38
Id.
39
Creek & Yoder, supra note 34 at 684.
40
Id. at 685.
41
Moira Herbst, Immigration Amid a Recession, BUS. WK. (May 8, 2009),
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/may2009/db2009058_701
427.htm.
42
See id; see also Victoria M. Esses, et al., The Immigration Dilemma: The Role of Perceived
Group Competition, Ethnic Prejudice, and National Identity, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 389, 412
(2001).
43
See, e.g., Rene Rocha & Rodolfo Espino, Racial Threat, Residential Segregation, and
37
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from an increase in racial and ethnic minority populations in
traditionally homogenous white communities can be explained by
the racial threat hypothesis, under which it is believed that high
concentrations of minority populations becomes a threat to a larger
44
group’s economic and social privilege. In addition, some believe
that an increase in the unauthorized immigrant population is
45
accompanied by a spike in the crime rate. An additional political
factor hindering immigration policy innovation is divided
government, as illustrated by the case of the 2013 debate on
immigration policy reform. In Congress, Republicans control the U.S.
House of Representatives, and the Democrats, by a small margin,
46
control the Senate. As evidenced by the federal government
shutdown of October 2013 and the acrimonious dialogue between
the two political parties, it comes as no surprise that Congress has
been unable to agree on innovative immigration reform policies.
Francis Lee’s analysis of patterns of legislative conflict between
the 1980s and the first decade of the twenty-first century has
significant utility for understanding the effect divided government
has on immigration policy reform. Lee finds that changes of the
legislative agenda in the past two decades is to blame for the rise of
47
legislative conflict. According to Lee,
The types of issues that were most divisive along partisan
lines in earlier periods became progressively more
prominent on the congressional agenda. Meanwhile, issues
that tended to divide the parties internally in earlier periods
became a smaller proportion of the agenda. In short, the
content of the Senate agenda was altered in ways that
48
facilitated higher levels of partisan voting.

the Policy Attitudes of Anglos, 62 POL. RES. Q. 415, 416 (2009); Paul McClain, et. al.,
Racial Distancing in a Southern City: Latino Immigrants’ Views of Black Americans, 68 J.
POL. 571, 584 (2006).
44
Rocha & Espino, supra note 43, at 415.
45
Randal C. Archibold, On Border Violence, Truth Pales Compared to Ideas, N.Y. TIMES
(June
19,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/us/20crime.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
46
See Composition of Congress, by Political Party, 1855-2015, INFOPLEASE,
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0774721.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2014).
46 Lee, supra note 9, at 200.
47
Lee, supra note 9, at 200.
48
Id. at 200.
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Lee argues that such internal consensus building on issues often
49
results in nondecision making. According to Lee, “although this
behind-the-scenes collaboration and consensus building is not visible
using the methods that empirical social scientists typically use,
nondecisions profoundly shape the legislative agenda, biasing the
legislative agenda toward issues that unify the parties internally while
50
distinguishing the parties from one another.”
The next section of this Article will identify six major elements
to the first pillar of the Bipartisan Framework, which relates to a
pathway to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants already present
in the United States. The Article will then analyze how federal law
already approaches or has historically approached the legislative goal
aimed of each element. The Article will also assess whether the
Bipartisan Framework proposes a substantively new approach towards
regulating unauthorized immigration, or one that is merely a
manifestation of nondecision making.
A. Pillar Number One— A Path to Citizenship for Unauthorized
Immigrants
Pillar number one of the Bipartisan Framework, as it relates to a
path to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants, includes six major
elements, which are as follows:
(1) Requiring those who came or remained in the United States
without Congressional permission to register with the government;
(2) Requiring unauthorized immigrants to pass a background
check and settle their debts to society by paying a fine and back taxes
in order to earn probationary legal status, which will allow them to
live and work legally in the United States;
(3) Providing that individuals with a serious criminal
background or others who pose a threat to national security will be
ineligible for legal status and subject to deportation;
(4) Providing that illegal immigrants who have committed
serious crimes face immediate deportation;
(5) Requiring individuals with probationary legal status to go to
the back of the line of prospective immigrants, pass an additional

49
50

Id. at 217.
Id.
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background check, pay taxes, learn English and civics, demonstrate a
history of work in the United States, and current employment, among
other requirements, in order to earn the opportunity to apply for and
earn lawful permanent residency;
(6) Providing that individuals who are present without lawful
status— not including certain childhood entrants and certain
agricultural workers— will only receive a green card after every
individual who is already waiting in line for a green card, at the time
51
this legislation is enacted, has received their green card.
These six elements were likely a result of a compromise in which
the proposal’s Democratic authors bargained for a pathway to
legalization for an estimated 11 million undocumented aliens
presently in the United States, in exchange for tighter border security
and penalties for those unlawfully present sought by Republican party
52
sponsors. According to a New York Times article published
simultaneously to the publication’s release of the Bipartisan
Frameworks’ details, senate Democrats stated that while they were
flexible in seeking the bill, “there’s a bottom line, and that’s a path to
53
citizenship for the 11 or so million people who qualify.” Preston, the
author of the Times article, described the proposal as an attempt to
“address the failings of the immigration system in one comprehensive
measure, rather than in smaller pieces, and to offer a ‘tough, fair and
practical road map’ that would eventually lead to a chance at
citizenship for nearly all of the immigrants [in the United States]
54
illegally.” Notably, the proposal was released one day before
President Barack Obama’s anticipated release of his administration’s
55
proposal for immigration reform.
1. Element One— Registration Requirement
The Bipartisan Framework sets forth a plan to “require persons
who came or remained in the United States without Congressional
56
permission to register with the government.” In other words,
51

Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 1-3.
See Preston, supra note 2.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. (noting the date of President Obama’s proposal for immigration reform,
January 29, 2013).
56
Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 2.
52
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persons who have entered without inspection (that is, without being
57
“admitted”), or who have overstayed the terms of their admission
58
(“visa overstayers”), would be required to affirmatively identify their
unlawful presence in the United States through some type of
document. This proposed registration requirement, however, is not a
novel idea. Federal law already requires all aliens to register their
59
presence in the United States. The Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”), which requires every alien in the United States who is
fourteen years of age or older and remains in the United States for
thirty days or longer to apply for registration and be fingerprinted
before the expiration of that thirty days, is applicable to aliens who
60
have not been admitted into the country. Under the INA, willful
failure to register carries a fine up to $1000 and/or imprisonment for
61
a term of no more than six months.
Further, the issuance of entry documents, found in Part III of
the INA, mandates that every alien who applies for a visa “be
62
registered in connection with his application.” In addition, “no visa
shall be issued to any alien seeking to enter the United States until
such alien has been registered in accordance with section 1201(b)” of
63
the INA. With the advent of this registration requirement, the U.S.
government has mandated that non-immigrants complete the Form I64
94 (or I-94W for visa waiver entrants). This I-94 form records (1) the
date and place of entry of the alien into the United States, (2)
activities in which the alien intends to be engaged, and (3) the length

57

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(13) (2013) (defining the term “admitted” as “the lawful
entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer”).
58
See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182 (a)(9)(B)(2) (providing that an alien is deemed to be
unlawfully present in the United States if the alien is present in the United States
after the expiration of the period of authorized stay).
59
8 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2010).
60
Id. There is a corresponding requirement that parents register their children
under 14 years of age. 8 U.S.C. § 1302(b).
61
8 U.S.C. § 1306(a).
62
8 U.S.C. § 1201 (2010).
63
8 U.S.C. § 1301 (2010).
64
See I-94 Automation, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER CONTROL, (last updated Mar.
2013)
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/travel/i94_factsheet.
ctt/i94_factsheet.pdf.
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of time the alien is authorized to remain in the United States. In the
case of an alien who enters the United States with inspection, but
overstays the terms of his or her visa, federal law similarly provides a
66
scheme in which these persons must be registered. Thus, existing
federal law evidences that Congress has already articulated its policy
stance that persons who “came or remained in the United States
without Congressional permission” must register with the
67
government. On this point, the Bipartisan Framework simply
restates current law, and does not propose a substantively new
approach.
2. Element Two— Background Checks, Fines, and Back
Taxes
The second element of the first pillar of the Bipartisan
Framework is a proposed requirement that unauthorized immigrants
pass a background check, and pay a fine and back taxes in order to
earn probationary legal status allowing that a person to live and work
68
legally in the United States. However, federal law already requires
non-citizens to undergo background checks in order to obtain
69
immigration benefits such as “lawfully present” status.
Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on American soil,
the U.S. government (largely through the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security), has increased its usage of
70
background checks to screen applicants for immigration benefits.
According to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”), a government entity “responsible for ensuring that [the
U.S.] immigration system is not used as a vehicle to harm our nation
or its citizens by screening out people who seek immigration benefits
65

8 U.S.C. § 1304(a) (1996).
Such an alien is a “non-immigrant” because an immigrant visa holder cannot, by
definition, “overstay.” See 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(15)(A)-(V) (2010) et. seq. (listing the
various classes of non-immigrants).
67
Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 2.
68
See id.
69
See 8 CFR §103.16; 8 CFR §240.67. See also U.S. CITIZEN AND IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
IMMIGRATION SECURITY CHECKS--HOW AND WHY THE PROCESS WORKS 1 (2006)
[hereinafter “IMMIGRATION SECURITY CHECKS"] , available at
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/pressrelease/security_checks_42506.p
df.
70
See IMMIGRATION SECURITY CHECKS, supra note 68, at 1.
66
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improrperly or fraudulently,” background checks are done “to
enhance national security and ensure the integrity of the
71
immigration process.” The USCIS has established a background
security check process aimed at identifying risk factors that may affect
72
In general,
an immigrant’s eligibity for an immigration benefit.
USCIS uses three types of background check procedures and retains
the prerogative to conduct other background investigations as
73
needed. The background check procedures include (1) the
Interagency Border Inspection System Name Check, (2) FBI
74
Fingerprint Check, and (3) FBI Name Checks. Also part and parcel
of the government’s existing background check process is the
requirement that persons seeking certain immigrant benefits
75
complete the Form G-325A. This form facilitates the government’s
construction of the applicant’s biographical history and provides the
76
data needed to conduct a thorough background check. Given that
there is already a legal mandate for immigration background checks,
the Bipartisan Framework proposes to restate current law and does
not offer a substantively new approach.
The Bipartisan Framework’s proposal that persons unlawfully
present in the United States first attain “probationary legal status” is
also not a novel approach. Under the Immigration and Reform
77
Control Act (“IRCA”), a similarly reform-oriented piece of
legislation signed into law by President Ronald Reagan in 1986, an
alien first has to acquire “lawful temporary resident” (“LTR”) status
78
before he or she can acquire lawful permanent resident status. Also,

71

Id.
Id. at 2.
73
Id.
74
See id.
75
8 CFR § 103.16 (providing the regulatory basis for requiring the Form G-325A
for certain applications).
76
See IMMIGRATION SECURITY CHECKS, supra note 68, at 1.
77
Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) [hereinafter “IRCA”] (amending
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
78
IRCA § 245A (codified at § 8 USC 1255a). It is worth noting that the Bipartisan
Framework uses the term “probationary legal status” rather than “lawful temporary
resident.” It remains to be seen whether the Bipartisan Framework’s “probationary
legal status” and all of its inner workings will be tantamount to IRCA’s LTR status.
80 Pub. L. No. 103-317, 108 Stat. 1724 (Aug. 26, 1994) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1255(i)(1994)).
72
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the concept of a paying a fine before a person unlawfully present in
the United States can embark upon the pathway to lawfully present
status is in fact not entirely new. In 1994, Congress enacted Section
79
245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). This
provision allowed applicants who were otherwise ineligible under
Section 245, such as by reason of having entered the United States
80
without inspection, to remain in the United States while completing
the process of adjusting their status to lawful permanent resident
instead of having to leave the country to complete consular
81
processing. A major hallmark of this provision was the requirement
that the applicant pay a monetary penalty in return for the right to
82
remain in the country while completing the adjustment process.
While Congress extended eligibility for 245(i) adjustment of status
benefits when it passed the Legal Immigration Family Equity
83
(“LIFE”) Act and LIFE Act Amendments, it nevertheless retained
84
the penalty structure. Today, eligible applicants are required to pay
a one thousand dollar penalty along with their submission of Form I85
485, Supplement A. In light of the penalty structure put in place by
previous adjustment of status legislation, it is apparent that the
Bipartisan Framework’s fine requirement restates current
immigration policy and does not offer a substantively new approach.
Some argue that the Bipartisan Framework nevertheless contains
86
a tougher stance than IRCA. For example, IRCA does not require
undocumented immigrants to pay back taxes to attain lawful
87
temporary resident status. Thus, the Bipartisan Framework’s
proposal that undocumented immigrants pay back taxes before they
79

Pub. L. No. 103-317, 108 Stat. 1724 (Aug. 26, 1994) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1255(i)(1994)).
80
8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).
81
8 U.S.C. § 1255(i).
82
Id.
83
Pub. L. No. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762 (2000).
84
See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i).
85
8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(1)(C); 8 C.F.R. § 245.10(b).
86
See, e.g., Ryan Teague Beckwith, Immigration plan: How 1986 amnesty compares to
Senate proposal, DENVER POST (Jan. 29, 2013) available at
http://www.marinij.com/politics-national/2013/01/immigration-plan-how-1986amnesty-compares-to-senate-proposal.
87
However, the process of applying for LTR status does require the applicant to
pay a fee. See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(e)(3).
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may attain lawful status is an admittedly novel reform. However, while
it may be the case that the Bipartisan Framework’s back taxes
requirement is novel, it is nonetheless problematic and paradoxical
in several ways. First, it presumes that an unlawfully present person
who seeks to attain legal status has earned taxable income in the past.
However, the INA makes it unlawful for any person who is an
“unauthorized alien” to be, inter alia, hired for purposes of
88
employment and thus paid wages. Assuming the unlawfully
employed alien has not acquired an Individual Taxpayer
Identification Number and complied with the federal income tax
filing guidelines, the government would require evidence that taxable
wages have been paid to an alien employee and not reported (i.e.,
paid “under the table”). To achieve this goal, either the alien would
have to self-identify and report taxable income earned but not
reported to the federal government (potentially exposing the
89
employer to civil and criminal penalties under INA Section 274A , as
well as I-9 raids), or the employer would have to report to the federal
government its own unlawful employment practices. Thus, while the
Bipartisan Framework admittedly contains a substantive reform with
this particular proposal, it creates a paradoxical and infeasible goal.
3. Elements Three and Four— Deportation and Lack of
Eligibility for Legal Status of Individuals with Serious
Criminal Backgrounds and Those Who Pose a Threat to
National Security
Element three of the Bipartisan Framework, dealing with
deportation, and element four, dealing with lack of eligibility for
legal status, although bifurcated in the report, should be analyzed as
a single element because under the INA, individuals adjudged
ineligible for legal status in the United States are typically deemed
90
deportable as well. Elements three and four of the Bipartisan
Framework propose to make individuals who have serious criminal
backgrounds or who pose a threat to the national security of the
91
United States ineligible for legal status and subject to deportation.

88

8 U.S.C. §1324(a)(1)(A) (2005).
8 U.S.C. § 1324a.
90
See 8 U.S.C. §1229(a) (2006).
91
See Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 2.
89
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What is particularly striking about these proposals is that they imply
that the law is currently silent or incapable of addressing the
concerns underlying these elements. However, a current reading of
the law regarding the grounds upon which a non-citizen can be
deported from the United States reveals that this is not the case.
Section 237(a)(2) of the INA currently lists various grounds for
deportation, including a host of “serious crimes”, as well as some
lesser crimes, such as multiple criminal convictions, commission of an
aggravated felony, failure to register as a sex offender, controlled
substances violations, crimes of domestic violence, and crimes
92
relating to espionage, sabotage, treason, and sedition. Further,
section 237(a)(4) of the INA 237(a)(4) lists national security-related
grounds of deportation, such as espionage, sabotage, and any other
93
criminal activity that endangers public safety or national security.
This section also makes deportable “any alien whose presence or
activities in the United States . . . would have potentially serious
94
adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States.” Thus,
on these issues, the Bipartisan Framework does not propose
substantive policy reform. On the contrary, the plan simply restates
the current statutory approach.
4. Element Five— Probationary Legal Status
Requirements
The Bipartisan Framework appears to propose a two-step process
for unauthorized immigrants currently living in the United States to
attain legal status. The first step would require such individuals to
attain a type of probationary legal status referred to as “registered
95
provisional immigrant” status. Presumably, it is the holders of this
status who would be required to “go to the back of the line of
prospective immigrants, pass an additional background check, pay
taxes, learn English and civics, demonstrate a history of work in the
United States, and current employment, among other requirements,”
and only when the applicant satisfies these requirements may he or
96
she attain lawful permanent resident status. Overall, this portion of
92

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2000).
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4).
94
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(C)(i).
95
See S.744 § 2101.
96
Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 2.
93
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the Bipartisan Framework suggests a construct that mirrors the
legalization requirements of IRCA and its regulations, which set forth
requirements by which a person having lawful temporary resident
97
status could adjust to permanent resident status. The following table
highlights the similarities between IRCA and the Bipartisan
Framework in obtaining legal status.

97

See 8 C.F.R. § 245a.3.
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Table 1: Similarities between 1986 IRCA and
2013 Bipartisan Framework
IRCA 1986
Bipartisan Framework 2013
Proposals
Required proof that the applicant
Applicant must undergo
99
had not been convicted of any
additional background check.
felony, or three or more
98
misdemeanors.
Required applicant to
Applicant must learn English
101
demonstrate minimal
and civics.
understanding of ordinary
English and a knowledge and
understanding of the history and
government of the United
100
States.
Required applicants to “stand in
Applicants must go to the “back
102
line.”
of the line of prospective
103
immigrants.”
An applicant who had a
Applicant must have a history of
105
consistent employment history
employment.
which showed the ability to
support himself or herself even
though his or her income was
below the poverty level was
104
deemed not excludable.
106
An applicant was not required to
Applicant must pay taxes.
pay taxes.
As shown in the above table, both the Bipartisan Framework and
98

8 C.F.R. § 245a.3(b)(3).
Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 2.
100
8 C.F.R. § 245a.3(b)(4)(i)(A).
101
Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 2.
102
8 C.F.R. § 245a.3(a)(1)(providing that an alien could not adjust to permanent
residency until granted LTR status).
103
Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 2.
104
8 C.F.R. § 245a.3(g)(4)(iii).
105
Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 2.
106
Id.
99
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IRCA require vetting of an applicant’s background to demonstrate
that the applicant has not been convicted of any felony, or three or
more misdemeanors. The Bipartisan Framework proposes that
applicants must learn English and civics. Similarly, IRCA required
applicants to demonstrate minimal understanding of ordinary
English and a knowledge and understanding of the history and
government of the United States. The employment history of an
applicant is also considered under both the Bipartisan Framework
and the IRCA. The Bipartisan Framework proposes that an applicant
must have a history of employment. Under IRCA, applicants who
could show a consistent employment history that demonstrated an
ability to support themselves, even though their income was below
107
the poverty level, were deemed not excludable as a public charge.
5. Element Six— Unlawfully Present Persons Must Go to
the End of the Line and Wait
While the IRCA and the Bipartisan Framework adhere to the
idea of “standing in line,” they differ with respect to an applicant’s
placement in line. The Bipartisan Framework adopts a conservative
approach by proposing that unlawfully present aliens in the United
States be required to go to the “end of the line” and wait before
108
attaining lawful status.
Unlawfully present aliens would “only
receive a green card after every individual who is already waiting in
line for a green card, at the time this legislation is enacted, has
109
received their green card.”
The requirement that unlawfully
present aliens be forced to the end of the line is a testament to the
Republican Party’s desire to avoid criticism that the proposal would
110
be tantamount to amnesty. In a statement made regarding the
Bipartisan Framework, Republican Senator John McCain said, “‘[w]e
have got to show my constituents and our Republicans . . . this is not
amnesty . . . This is a tough road to citizenship but we have got to give

107

Id.
Id.
109
Id.
110
Jordan Fabian, Why Republicans Must Break the “Amnesty” Stereotype for Immigration
Reform, FUSION (Apr. 11, 2013, 10:53 AM),
http://fusion.net/leadership/story/immigration-republicans-break-amnestystereotype-12070.
108
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111

[unlawfully-present aliens] the opportunity to do so.’”
Under the INA, there are numerical quotas for the number of
immigrant visas that may be issued to individuals in a certain
preference category seeking permanent resident status each year.
The limit for family-sponsored immigrants is outlined in INA
112
113
201(c) for employment-sponsored immigrants in INA 201(d) and
114
for diversity immigrants in INA 201(e). When an immigrant visa
category becomes oversubscribed, the excess petitions roll over to the
next quota period and a waiting list (sometimes referred to as a “visa
115
116
queue”) is created. Under INA 203(e)(1) family and employmentbased visas must be issued in the order in which the petitions were
117
received, otherwise known as the “priority date.” Thus, family and
employment-sponsored immigrants must already go to the end of the
numerical line and wait. For some applicants, particularly from
countries like Mexico, the Philippines, and India, this can mean
118
waiting as long as fifteen or more years until receiving a visa.
Although the Bipartisan Framework does not suggest a separate
line, or preference category, for unlawfully present aliens seeking to
attain lawful presence in the United Statesdoes not change the
current numerical quota system currently in place. Presumably,
applicants in this category will be subject to the same visa issuance
111

Reid Pillifant, Schumer: Immigration plan ‘is not amnesty in any sense of the word’,
CAPITAL NEW YORK (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2013/01/7416538/schumerimmigration-plan-not-amnesty-any-sense-word.
112
See 8 U.S.C. §1151(a)(1).
113
See 8 U.S.C. §1151(a)(2).
114
See 8 U.S.C. §1151(a)(3).
115
Visa Retrogression, US CITIZENSHIP IMMIGRATION SERVS. (June 15, 2011),
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6
d1a/?vgnextoid=aa290a5659083210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=
aa290a5659083210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD.
116
8 U.S.C. §1153(e)(1).
117
THE OPERATION OF THE IMMIGRANT NUMERICAL CONTROL SYSTEM, BUREAU OF
CONSULAR AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF STATE (2010), available at
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Immigrant%20Visa%20Control%20Syste
m_operation%20of.pdf.
118
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, VISA BULL. NO. 65, VOL.
9, IMMIGRANT NUMBERS FOR FEBRUARY 2014 (2014), available at
http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/law-and-policy/bulletin/2014/visabulletin-for-february-2014.html.
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scheme set forth in INA 203(e)(1). A meaningful reform under the
Bipartisan Framework would have been for Congress to make a
drastic increase in the number of immigrant visas that can be issued
annually, instead of simply capping the number of visas for this
category of aliens just it did for the other categories of aliens.
III.

CONCLUSION

This Article focused on a framework articulated by a bipartisan
group of eight U.S. senators proposing a purportedly major reform of
the U.S. immigration system. This proposal came on the heels of
President Barack Obama’s inauguration to his second term of office
and the President’s longing desire to overhaul the nation’s
immigration system. The senators, in claiming that the U.S.
immigration system is “broken,” offered a plan aimed at, among
other things, creating an arduous pathway for individuals who are
currently unlawfully present in the United States. The framework,
introduced by the Senate as the Border Security, Economic
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act of 2013, was
119
passed by the Senate on June 27, 2013. However, the proposal has
not yet been considered by the U.S. House of Representatives.
This Article focused on one of the four “pillars” of the Bipartisan
Framework that aimed at creating “a tough but fair path to
citizenship for unauthorized immigrants currently living in the
120
United States.” The goal of this Article was to explore whether,
applying the literature on policy innovation and nondecision making,
the policies proposed in each element of this pillar amounted to
policy innovation or mere nondecision making. As used in this
Article, policy innovation is the adoption of problem-solving
approaches that depart from traditional legislative approaches to
regulation of immigration. In light of the analysis above, this Article
concludes that the plan to create a tough pathway to citizenship for
unauthorized immigrants articulated in the Bipartisan Framework is
not a policy innovation, but is instead a nondecision by Congress
resulting from the contentious nature of immigration reform and the
electoral stakes involved.

119
120

S. 744, 133th Cong. (2013-2014).
Bipartisan Framework, supra note 1 at 1.

